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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH I 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JOHNNIE OWEN WADE I 
Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 14840 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
Johnnie Owen Wade was charged in a criminal pro-
ceeding by the State of Utah, of the offense of three counts 
of automobile homicide in violation of Utah Code Annotated, 
76-5-207 (Supp. 1977). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On September 27, 1976, Johnnie Owen Wade was found 
guilty of automobile homicide as charged in the information 
by the Judge, Allen B. Sorenson, sitting without a jury, in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for Utah County, State 
of Utah and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 0 to 5 
Years in the Utah State Prison. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an Order of their Court reversing 
the finding of guilty as entered by the Trial Court, and the 
entry of an order dismissing any action against the Defendan: 
or, in the al terna ti ve, a ruling remanding the case for a ne·; 
trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case involves the deaths of three individuals 
in an automobile accident which occured on May 10, 1976, in 
Utah County, State. of Utah. The Defendant, Johnnie Owen Wade 
was charged with automobile hom±cide in connection with this 
accident. 
At trial, the first witness was Myrna Butler, an 
employee of a cafe in Santaquin, Utah. ( T. 14) . She testifiei 
that at about 7: 30 until about 10: 30, on May 10, 1976, she 
observed the Defendant and Leo Craig Fenster at the cafe and 
observed both of them drinking beer. (T.16). 
The second witness was Leo Fenster, who was present 
the Defendant in the Defendant's pick-up truck at the time c:. 
collision. (T. 21). d h When he and the Defendant He state t at 
· le (T.;: 
l f h f · S · h dri· vi· ng the vehic · e t t e ca e in antaquin, e was 
3 
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After stopping at the Defendant's girl friend's house 
i:i Santaquin, the Defendant drove the truck out of Santaquin, 
west on the two lane highway toward Goshen, Utah. (T.29). Mr. 
Fenster said that there was nothing unusual about the manner in 
which the Defendant was driving the truck that evening (T.32). 
He said the truck was traveling at a normal speed of about 
fifty to sixty miles an hour. (T.33). He recalled that the 
truck proceeded around a right-hand curve in the road without 
any problem. ( T. 3 4) . He described his observations immediately 
prior to the head-on collision as follows: 
"As we was coming around the turn, when I looked 
back I could see the headlights and they were 
starting to come across the railroad tracks, be-
cause they were moving, you know, coming across 
the tracks, and, anyway, it looked to me that 
the lights started to come over into our lane 
and, anyway, I just looked at John and I said 
"John, look out." I thought for a minute what 
was going on. You know, it went through my mind. 
And I turned and I looked at John. I said, "John, 
look out. We are going to hit." And then it 
seemed like we just crashed. Then I could see 
John. He had ahold of the steering wheel, you 
know, and it crashed and he went out. (T.34). 
The third witness was Thomas Cox, of Payson, Utah, 
who was the dri· ver of the 1974 · · h · h Honda Civic automobile in w ic 
his wife and two children were riding. (T.36) He ~estified 
that he was going east down Highway 91 at about fifty-five 
miles Per hour at about 11:00 p.m. on May 10, 1976. (T.39). 
--
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He stated that he observed headlights of another vehicle 
coming in the opposite direction which appeared to be in k 
lane of traffic. (T. 39). He recalled dust coming up fromt\: 
shoulder of the road next to the east bound lane of traffic. 
(T. 40). He swerved to the left into the other lane of traff; 
because he believed that the other vehicle would continue 
straight ahead in his lane of traffic. (T.41). 
The State called as a witness, T. Robert Hogan, a 
physician, who testified that Debra, Malinda, and Jeremy cox 
were all killed as a result of the accident. (T.52). 
The evidence indicated that the Defendant was give:, 
a blood test at 1:20 a.m. on May 11, 1976, at the Payson 
Hospital. (T. 64.) , and that as a result of chemical analysis 
the blood-alchol was . 12 grams of alcohol per hundred grams:' 
blood. (T. 73). 
The next witness for the State was Michael Okelber:: 
who was the driver of the vehicle which was behind the 191~ 
Honda prior to the collision. (T.83). He stated that from 
about one-half mile away he observed the taillights of the Co' 
vehicle, and the headlights of the vehicle driven by the oefe 
dan t. ( T. 8 5 ) . 
out. (T.85). 
He said that at the same time both of the l[c: 
On cross-examination, he admitted that he neve: 
d t k Cros
s in front of: 
saw the headlights of the Defen ants rue 
h head!:: t · movements of t e victims car and never say any erra 1c 
of the Defendant's vehicle. (T.95). 
-4- e 
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Gary N. Johnson, a trooper for the Utah Highway 
Patrol, was called as an expert witness. (T. 96) • He 
testified that the point of impact ocurred five feet into 
the westbound lane of traffic, the lane of traffic in which 
the Defendant was traveling and not in the lane in which the 
victim's vehicle was traveling. (T.99). The road was 
thirty-two feet wide at the point of impact. (T.101). 
A written statement made by the Defendant, which 
substantially corroborated the testimony of Craig "Red" 
Fenster, the passenger in his vehicle, was introduced into 
evidence. The Defendant stated that he said "Red said, 
'look out, there's a car' and "I turned the wheel and there 
was an imp0;ct." T.110). Upon questioning, the Defendant 
said he turned the wheel to the right. (T.111). 
Both the State and the Defense offered expert 
witnesses who testified extensively on the basis of the 
photographs taken of the vehicles and the skid marks at the 
~ene. (T.106, T.143). Each of the experts reached different 
conclusions from the evidence as to the possible position of 
the truck, in relation to the Honda, prior to impact. {T.106, 
T .14 3) • 
I. 
THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION SHOULD BE REVERSED 
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE STATE AT TRIAL WAS 
NOT SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE 
OF AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE. 
bn -5-
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The appellant's case was tried without a jury 
to the trial judge, the Honorable Allen Sorensen. The 
appellant made a motion to dismiss the case at the close of 
the State's evidence on the ground that the State had 
failed to prove a prima facie case of Automobile Homicide. 
(T. 140). This motion renewed at the c:lose of the defendan: 
case. (T. 169). 
In response to Appellant's motion, the Court 
expressly found that there had been no showing of any 
criminal negligence. ( T. 16 9 ) • When the case was submitted. 
the Judge made the following ruling: 
"THE COURT: Well, I find that the defendant 
was driving a motor vehicle on a public 
highway under the influence of liquor, 
intoxicating liquor, within the meaning 
of the statute and that he was negligent 
in that he was on the wrong side of the 
road and that that negligence was a cause 
of the death of each of the persons contained 
in each of the counts. I expressly do not 
find that he was criminally negligent within 
the meaning of the statute, and I therefore 
find him guilty." (T. 172). 
The Appellant submits that the evidence does 
not support the finding of negligence on the part of the 
defendant. The evidence presented at trial indicates that 
the point of impact between the two vehicles occurred in 
elli'. 
the westbound lane of traffic, the lane in which the APP 
was operating his vehicle, and not in the victims' lane 
of traffic. (T. 99). The exhibits and photographs 
to rest north of indicate that the victims' vehicle came 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
> 
the highway next to the westbound lane of traffic. The 
expert witness, David Lord, who testified on the part of 
the defendant, (T. 142 to 168), was of the opinion that 
damage to both vehicles as shown by the photographs did not 
indicate that the victims' vehicle, the Honda, made contact 
with the defendant's truck in the manner described by the 
driver of the Honda. (T. 153). 
The fact that the defendant was in the proper 
lane of traffic was further corroborated by the testimony 
of Craig Finster. (T. 21). Mr. Finster, the passenger 
in the defendant's truck, observed the collision and was 
the only witness with a present recollection of the events 
following the accident. He stated that he observed the 
other vehicle cross a set of railroad tracks and start 
to come over into the westbound lane of traffic. (T. 34). 
Prior to the accident he did not notice any erratic movements 
of the truck, and noted nothing unusual concerning the 
defendant's driving pattern. (T. 33). The statement 
of the Appellant introduced into evidence is consistent 
with the account of the accident made by Mr. Finster. 
(T. 110). 
The Appellant submits that the State did not meet 
the burden of proving 
doubt in light of the 
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
above-described facts. Therefore, 
this Court f . . 
a ter reviewing the record and evidence should 
set a.· d 
si, e the judgment of conviction in this matter and 
-7-
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award the Appellant a new trial. 
II. 
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT EXPRESSLY RULED THAT 
THE APPELLANT WAS NOT CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT, THE DEFENDANT 
CANNOT BE CONVICTED OF AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE. 
In State v. Durrant, 561 P.2d 1056 (Utah, 1977), 
the Court dealt with the conflict which exists between 
the language of the automobile homicide statute, Utah Code 
Annotated, 76-5-207 (Supp. 1977) and the provisions of 
the Utah Criminal Code which define the requisite elements 
of mental intent, Utah Code Annotated 76-2-101, 76-2-103, 
and 76-5-201. 
Justice Ellett, writing the majority opinion, 
expressly found that the element of criminal negligence 
was present in that case, 561 P.2d at 1058, and held that 
the Court had correctly instructed the jury. The ruling 
of that case does not remove the necessity of a finding of 
criminal negligence in an automobile homicide case. 
In Appellant's case, the trial judge expressly 
held that the defendant was not criminally negligent. 
(T. 169, T. 172). Therefore, the State did not prove each 
element of the case beyond a reasonable doubt and the 
defendant's conviction should be reversed. 
-8-
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III. 
THIS COURT SHOULD OVERRULE STATE V. DURRANT AND 
~ V. ANDERSON TO THE EXTENT THAT THESE DECISIONS HOLD 
THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH CRIMINAL CODE ARE NOT 
APPLICABLE TO THE OFFENSE OF AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE. 
In State v. Anderson, 561 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1977), 
Justice Ellett described the scope of the ruling in the 
case of State v. Durrant as follows: 
"The holding in the Durrant case was 
to the effect that simple negligence in 
the driving of a motor vehicle which causes 
the death of another person is all that is 
required when the driver is so under the 
influence of liquor as to be unable to drive 
his car in a reasonably safe and prudent 
manner." 
C. F. Maughn, Justice, dissenting at 561 P.2d 1058 and 
561 P.2d 1063. 
The Appellant submits that this decision violates 
Article V, Section I of the Utah State Constitution. That 
section prohibits this Court as a separate department of 
government from exercising a power properly belonging 
to the legislative department of the State government. 
State v. Johnson, 44 u. 18, 137 P. 632 (1913). As a result 
of the ruling set forth in Durrant and Anderson, this 
Court has effectively repealed several provisions of Utah 
Criminal Code , . i.e., Sections 76-2-101, 76-2-103, and 
76-5-201. Th 
e repeal of these sections of the law of the 
State · is properly the province of the Legislature and 
-9-
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not the Supreme Court. 
A clear conflict now exists in the Utah Criminal 
Code, Utah Code Annotated 76-1-101 et. ~' between the 
section which defines Criminal Hamic ide, Utah Code Annotatec 
76-5-201 (Supp. 1977) and the section defining Automobile 
Homicide 76-5-207 (Supp. 1977). A person can be convicted 
of Criminal Homicide by acting with simple negligence if 
he is under the influence of alcohol as defined by the 
statute and unlawfully causes the death of another. 
The Appellant submits that this Court should 
reconsider the ruling announced in State v. Durrant and 
State v. Anderson and overrule those dee is ions by adopting 
the reasoning set forth in the dissent and holding that 
a person must be found to act with criminally negligent in 
order to be convicted of Automobile Homicide. 
Durrant was a three to two decision with one 
member who is not presently with the Court. In ~· 
Justice Ellett, speaking of the decision in Gibb v. ~' 
533 P.2d 299 (Utah 1975), stated: 
"That case is of small value since it 
was decided by a divided court, three 
to two, and two of the three members 
who favored the decision are no longer 
with the Court." 561 P. 2d at 1057. 
b reversed The Appellant's conviction should e 
. case that because of the express finding entered in this 
of the defendar: 
there was no criminal negligence on the part 
order dismissing 
and the trial court directed to enter an 
f 
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any further action against the appellant. 
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